The
Brazilian perspective on the FTAA
(As
perspectivas brasileiras na ALCA)
Antônio de Moura Borges *
SUMMARY:
The FTAA
is a development of the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative announced by
President George Bush in 1990, which consisted of three pillars: reduction of
trade barriers; increased investment in the region; and debt relief. The
process of creating the FTAA actually began in 1994, when President Bill
Clinton took the initiative of inviting the Heads of State and of Government of
the Americas, with the exception of Cuba, for the Summit of the Americas, held
in Miami, in which the 34 democratic Western Hemisphere nations committed
themselves to pursuing the creation of an FTAA by the year 2005. The FTAA would
be the largest free trade area in the world, but negotiations aimed at its
creation, as it was envisioned since the beginning, have been difficult, given
the extreme political, cultural and economic dissimilarities among the Western
Hemisphere nations. Effective creation of the FTAA by next year with the
participation of all negotiating countries depends on reconciling Brazil and
the United States’ demands. Brazil and its partners in MERCOSUR proposal is
that the FTAA would be concentrated in market access and that in fifteen years
import tariffs of all products would be eliminated. The United States and its
partners in the Group of 14 do not agree as to the total elimination of tariffs
and demand more concessions especially in the areas of services, investments
and government procurement.**
I.
Introduction
At the
first Summit of the Americas, held in Miami in December, 1994 the leaders of
the thirty-four democratic Western Hemisphere nations – the entire hemisphere,
with the exception of Cuba – undertook the responsibility of creating the Free
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) by the year 2005. Despite years of
negotiations, important issues remain unsolved. The apparent inflexibility of
the negotiators in relation to certain controversial themes gives rise to
preoccupations about compliance with the date established for the creation of
the FTAA, the extent to which the FTAA will or will not comprise all
negotiating countries, and whether the very creation of the FTAA will occur at
all.
In this
article, I will discuss the importance of the FTAA, Brazilian concerns in the
negotiating process, and the prospects of the FTAA.
As it is
well known, the main difficulties that exist now for the full implementation of
the FTAA regard especially the different and conflicting positions of the
United States and Brazil as to some crucial aspects of the agreement.
Needless
to say that the views I will present are my own, which may not coincide with
the ones of the Brazilian Government.
The
Brazilian Ambassador to the United States, Rubens Barbosa, has said that:
"After five years here, I learned that Brazil is like Texas. We are big,
we think we are bigger than we really are and we are always at odds with the
United States". (1)
II.
Historical Background of the FTAA
Attempts
to create a free trade area among all – or almost all – States of the Western
Hemisphere are not recent. In 1967, the Conference of American Presidents (also
known as the Punta del Este Conference), convened in Punta del Este, Uruguay to
call for hemispheric free trade. (2) The situation at that time
perhaps was not favorable to carry on such an enterprise. The so-called
"Cold War" demanded special United States attention and many Latin
American countries were under nationalistic military regimes. However, the
failure to achieve any notable results was attributed primarily to the
differences between the United States and its neighbors to the south. (3)
In a
different national and international political context, on June 27, 1990 the
United States President George Bush announced the Enterprise for the Americas
Initiative, which consisted of three pillars: reduction of trade barriers;
increased investment in the region; and debt relief. (4) However,
the process of creating an FTAA actually began in 1994, when the United
President Bill Clinton, after taking the necessary diplomatic steps and with
the agreement of all governments, formally invited the Heads of State and of
Government of the Americas, with the exception of Cuba, for the first Summit of
the Americas, held in Miami from December 9 to 11. At the Summit, in which the
leaders of the thirty-four democratic Western Hemisphere nations (5)
– with the exception of Cuba, the entire hemisphere – committed themselves to
pursuing the creation of an FTAA by the year 2005, two basic documents were
adopted: the Miami Summit’s Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action. The
Declaration of Principles stated the following commitments: partnership for
development and prosperity: democracy, free trade and sustainable developments
in the Americas; to preserve and strengthen the community of democracies of the
Americas; to promote prosperity through economic integration and free trade; to
eradicate poverty and discrimination in our hemisphere; and to guarantee
sustainable development and conserve our natural environment for future
generations. (6) Since then, three more Summits of the Americas were
held: the second in Santiago in 1998; the third in Quebec in 2001; and the
fourth in Monterrey last January 13, 2004. (7)
To
accomplish the objectives of creating the hemisphere free trade area, much work
has been done. Eight FTAA Trade Ministerial Meetings have been held, (8)
as well as sixteen Meetings of the Trade Negotiations Committee, and numerous
meetings of each one of the nine Negotiating Groups, the last ones with the
assistance of a Tripartite Committee, which consists of the Inter-American Bank
(IDB), the Organization of American States (OAS) and the United Nations
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). The
Negotiating Groups, as established in the San José Ministerial Declaration, in
March 1998, are the following: Market Access; Agriculture; Government
Procurement; Investment; Competition Policy; Intellectual Property Rights;
Services; Dispute Settlement; and Subsidies, Antidumping and Countervailing
Duties. (9)
III.
Brazilian Concerns
If
implemented, the FTAA will be the largest free trade area in the world, with a
population of 800 million people, 14% of the planet’s population, and gross
domestic product over US$12 trillion, 31% of the world’s wealth. (10)
However, the political, cultural and economic differences among the 34 founding
States are huge, for it includes countries like Haiti, on the one hand, and the
United States, on the other hand. Haiti is at present politically unstable, has
a gross domestic product of only US$2.8 billion, and gross domestic product per
capita of US$354. (11) The United States of America is the greatest
political, military and economic power in the world, with gross domestic
product of US$10,427.4 trillion in 2002 (12) "amounting to
nearly four-fifths of total GDP for the entire Western Hemisphere." (13)
Brazil
has a population of 174,630,000, total area of 8,511,965 sq. Km, or 3,286,470
square miles, which comprises nearly 50% of South America’s land mass, and
gross domestic product of US$452.4 billion in 2002. (14) It is the
world’s twelfth largest economy. Some years ago, it was the world’s eighth
largest economy. In 1998, Brazil’s gross domestic product was US$787.7 billion,
but, due to its currency devaluation crisis in 1999, even though the growth
rate has been of about 1.5% annual, (15) as measured in US dollars,
gross domestic product decreased sharply. "In October, 1997, Brazil was
able to stave off by itself the threat of an attack against its currency in the
wake of the Asia crisis, even though some $10 billion fled the country in a
single day." (16) In 1998, during the Russian crisis, Brazil
was not as fortunate.
Brazil is
the largest economy in South America, and the leading partner of MERCOSUR, the
Common Market of the Southern Cone, comprised of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay
and Uruguay. MERCOSUR "… accounts for 70 percent of South America’s
combined gross domestic product as well as 64 percent of the population"
(17), and, after the European Union (EU) and North American Free Trade
Association (NAFTA), it is the third largest trading bloc in the world. (18)
"This, in a sense, raises the stakes of the FTAA for MERCOSUR nations, as
they arguably have more to lose in the way of autonomy achieved, and effort
expended, in subregional integration than do other negotiating nations".
(19) MERCOSUR has achieved a significant political and commercial
success, (20) and is negotiating a free trade agreement with the
Andean Community and with the European Union. (21)
Brazil
and the United States have a long tradition of friendship and cooperation,
dating back at least as early as during the Second World War, but the size and
development level of their economies are greatly distinct.
Given the
huge dissimilarities between the United States and their negotiating partners
in the FTAA, one might wonder what benefits the United States would have. According
to David M. Gilmore, "Although Latin America is currently only 7 percent
of U.S. trade, it holds the promise of faster, long-term growth and potential
to be an important market. It also would support long-term merchandise trade
markets, open new trade in service markets and investment markets, and support
continued stability in the hemisphere." (22) Besides, U.S.
Trade Representative Robert B. Zoellick has said that, "If the Americas
are strong, the United States will be better positioned to pursue its aims
around the world. But if our hemisphere is troubled, we will be preoccupied at
home and handicapped abroad". (23)
In
Brazil, government authorities have always stated the importance of the FTAA,
especially in light of Brazil’s need to increase exports, and the U. S.
market’s position as the largest in the world. Since the beginning of the
negotiations, Brazil and its partners in MERCOSUR have worked towards the
creation of an FTAA that would be concentrated in market access and that would
have general rules, but which would respect the capacity of the countries to
have their own development models.
The
United States is Brazil’s major trading partner, having replaced the European
Union as the main destination market for Brazilian exports. In 2002, while the
European Union accounted for 25.04% of Brazilian exports, the United States
accounted for 25.74%, of which more than 75% represented by manufactured
products. (24) The United States is also Brazil’s major import trading
partner, accounting for 27.4% of Brazilian imports. (25) The FTAA
would enhance the opportunity to increment trade between the United States and
Brazil.
Brazil’s
main products are: aircraft (the single most important export product to the
United States), bauxite, beef, cellulose, cereals, coffee, cocoa, crude oil and
petrochemicals, diamonds, furniture, gold, households appliances, hydroelectric
power engines, iron ore, manganese, motor vehicles, nickel, orange juice,
phosphates, platinum, processed food, quartz crystals, rubber, shoes, silver,
soybeans, steel, sugar, textiles, timber, tin, titanium, uranium, and zinc.
(26)
Even
though manufactured products account for more than 75% of Brazilian exports to
the U.S. market, at the FTAA negotiations Brazil is especially interested in
market access to agricultural products, and the Andean countries even more so
than Brazil. However, the 2002 Farm Bill contains US$180 billion in U.S.
agriculture subsidies, (27) and the United States negotiators have
been unwilling to negotiate measures that would restrict agricultural
subsidies. (28)
Without
the use of subsidies, Brazilian agriculture developed and is nowadays the most
competitive in the world. (29) Among other factors, the climate in
Brazil is favorable. Brazil has the least per ton cost in several products,
such as beef, soybeans, sugar, coffee, poultry, shrimps, orange juice, and
cotton. (30) Brazil is the world largest producer and exporter of
coffee, sugar and orange juice, the second producer and the largest exporter of
beef and soybeans, and the second producer and exporter of poultry. (31)
In the
last 50 years, the United States offered the world the biggest and most open
market in the world for other country’s exports, as it still does, for the
average United States import tariff is low. (32) However, several
economic sectors, such as agricultural items and low-value-added manufactured
products, are highly protected through the use of tariff peaks, tariff
escalations and tariff rate quotas, in addition to non-tariff barriers, such as
antidumping and countervailing measures, which have affected Brazilian exports
of steel products. According to the Brazilian Embassy, "The tangible
impact on Brazil of this selective U.S. protectionism can be illustrated by a
comparison between Brazil’s average nominal import tariff on the 20 top U.S.
global export products, which was 11.54% in 2002, and the average nominal U.S.
import tariff on the 20 top Brazilian global export products, which was 44.4%
in 2002." (33) This results in large part because of the high
tariff equivalents rate on frozen orange juice, which in 2002 was 52%, and the
extra-quota tariff equivalents of 234% for raw sugar, 208% for refined sugar,
and 350% for tobacco, in 2002. (34) Furthermore, as stated by the
Brazilian Embassy, "the U.S. market is closed to Brazilian poultry
products for sanitary reasons, even though Brazil is the world’s second largest
exporter", and, as for beef, of which Brazil is the world’s largest
exporter, the U.S. extra-quota tariff is 26.4%, but the certification of
Brazilian unprocessed beef exports to the U.S. market had not been issued until
the end of 2003, even though the administrative procedures for such a purpose
have been underway since the year 2000. (35)
Brazil,
along with its partners in MERCOSUR, have asked for the elimination of import
tariffs of all products, agricultural and non-agricultural, so that the
Americas within fifteen years would become an area free of import tariffs, but
the United States is more interested in the areas of services, intellectual
properties, investments and government procurement. According to the Brazilian
Foreign Minister Celso Amorim, it is in these areas that the Brazilian
Government wishes to maintain sufficient autonomy to implement development
policies, (36) as the use of certain industrial policy instruments
that the developed countries use, (37) v. g., the Buy American Act
of 1933 and the Small Business Act of 1953. Great part of the American
Government purchases consists of arms and military equipment, restricted by law
to local suppliers. Brazilian Government purchases of military equipment are
not high, but the Brazilian Foreign Minister understands that it does not impede
the country to specify certain items that must be supplied by Brazilian
companies, aimed at a sector development. (38)
In the
United States, there are service sector restrictions, especially in the areas
of telecommunications and finance, mainly at the state level, and constraints
on foreign investment and foreign participation in government procurement
biddings. "Foreign investors may not hold more than a total of 49% of the
ownership shares of U.S. airlines, nor more than 25% of all voting stock. U.S.
cabotage shipping is restricted to vessels that were built in the U.S. and are
operated with U.S. owners, flag and crew. The U.S. fishing industry is
permitted to use only vessels built in the United States. The U.S. agricultural
products may be exported only on U.S.-flag ships, which thus constitutes a
completely protected shipping market. The ‘Buy American Act’ of 1933 also
establishes a preference for U.S. suppliers that applies to many government
purchases." (39)
Throughout
the FTAA negotiations, Brazil and the other MERCOSUR members have defended the
position that subjects of a systemic and normative nature should be dealt with
within the World Trade Organization (WTO). They take the view that it does not
make sense for the United States and the European Union to have rules about
intellectual propriety, investments and services that differ so widely. (40)
Brazilian
authorities consider that the FTAA is basically a negotiation with the United
States and Canada. (41) Brazil does not need the FTAA to reach the
markets in other countries, as the United States already has a free trade
agreement with Canada and Mexico. Except for Argentina, the remaining countries
are very small and, thus, they are not very much interested in negotiating.
(42)
That is
why since November 1st, 2002, and until the conclusion of the negotiations,
Brazil and the United States are the Co-Chairs of the FTAA Negotiations.
IV.
Prospects of the FTAA
Negotiations
towards the creation of the FTAA have not been easy. At the Eighth Trade
Ministerial Meeting, held last November, 2003, in Miami, agreement was reached
to create a "lite" version of the FTAA in which there would be a
common set of rights and obligations binding the 34 contracting nations without
more ambitious multilateral agreements of a binding nature.
Nevertheless,
minimum agreement to set up the FTAA has not yet been reached. The lack of
conciliation of specific issues caused a recess of the Seventeenth Meeting of
the Trade Negotiations Committee, held in Puebla last February 3 to 6. The
dates of March 17 to 19 were agreed for the Meeting to be continued, and the
recess would be used to give time for the nine Negotiating Groups to be
instructed as to the clear reach of the general treaty negotiations and the
definition of the multilateral negotiations procedures. (43) These
dates were postponed to April 22 and 23, at the request of the negotiating
parties, because the South American vice-chancellors, representing MERCOSUR,
the Andean Community and Chile, could not reach a consensus at a meeting held
last March 9 and 10 in Buenos Aires and will meet again next March 31 and April
1. (44)
The
success of the negotiations depends now on reconciling the demands of the Group
of 14 (G 14), (45) lead by the United States, with those of the
other countries. In relation to market access, the MERCOSUR proposal is that
all import tariffs will be eliminated in fifteen years, and the G 14 prefers
the elimination of tariffs "substantially on all trade". MERCOSUR
nations do not agree with the G 14’s proposal, for that would give rise for the
continued protection of beef, orange juice, steel, sugar and no more than
twenty other products in which the South American countries are mostly
interested in. In order to reconcile those demands, at the last day of the
Meeting in Puebla a new formula was proposed that could be the solution for the
impasse: the text would require a "substantial increase" in access to
the markets of the 34 partners of the FTAA. (46) MERCOSUR would
yield in its position because the tariff elimination would not be total, and
the G 14 would also yield in its position because a guarantee of
"substantial increase" in access to the partners’ markets would not
allow countries to keep on protecting their markets the way they do nowadays.
However,
other questions remain to be solved, especially the ones concerning services,
intellectual property, investments and government procurement. The Brazilian
Foreign Minister Celso Amorim has affirmed that he is optimistic about the
continuation of the Seventeenth Meeting of the Trade Negotiations Committee to
take place in Puebla next April 22 and 23, for he asked the U.S. Trade
Representative Robert B. Zoellick if the United States was interested in the
Brazilian market of goods, and he answered "yes, obviously". (47)
If there is this interest, Amorim feels there are no reasons for the United
States and the other members of the G 14 to insist on concessions in other
areas, besides market access. (48) This fact alone does not seem to
be enough ground for optimism.
Brazil is
a democratic country and, as in the United States, government decisions depend
on the Legislative Branch’s approval and are motivated by social support. Some
Brazilian Senators and Congressmen are opposed to the FTAA, mostly motivated by
ideological reasons, concrete material interests, and certain economic and
international political analysis, but the vast majority approve or disapprove
the FTAA, depending on its outcome, and the same happens to Brazilian society
as a whole. (49) As in the United States, in Brazil most labor
unions are against the FTAA. (50)
I
conclude these remarks using Professor Joseph J. Norton’s words about the FTAA,
with which I agree, when he affirmed that "… on a current basis, the
scenario is most difficult to evaluate (politically, economically and
financially). But what can be evaluated as it continues to unfold is the
overall process itself and its direct and indirect consequences. This will
assume a continued general sharing of common intergovernmental objectives; good
faith collaboration and consultations respecting the various FTAA Working
Groups, Ministerials, and Summits; and ongoing and enhanced transparency in the
process." (51)
Notas
** This
article was first presented as a Shihata Distinguished Lecture for the SMU Law
Institute of the Americas and the London Forum for International Economic Law
and Development, delivered on March 24th, 2004. The lecture was also sponsored
by the SMU International Law Society. For that opportunity, I thank Professor
John Attanasio, Dean of the SMU Dedman School of Law; Professor Joseph Norton,
President of the Law Institute of the Americas; Yolanda Eiseinstein, President
of the International Law Society; my long time Brazilian friend Professor
Marcos Aurélio Pereira Valadão, Research Fellow of the Law Institute of the
Americas and a Doctorate candidate at SMU Dedman School of Law; and CAPES, a
Foundation subordinated to the Ministry of Education of Brazil, for the
generous financial support which allowed me to do researches at the Georgetown
University Law Center, as a Visiting Scholar. I am also grateful for comments
from Christopher J. Ballantyne.
1 Quoted by Nora Boustany, Diplomatic
Dispatches, World News, The Washington Post, March 3, 2004, p. A16.
2 See Mark B. Baker, Integration
of the Americas: A Latin Renaissance or a Prescription for Disaster?, 11
Temp. Int’l & Comp. L. J. 309, 322 (1997), and Francisco de Assis
Grieco, in A Supremacia Americana e a Alca, 267 (Aduaneiras, 1998).
3 Id.
4 See Brandy A. Bayer, The
Expansion of NAFTA: Issues and Obstacles Regarding Accession by Latin American
States and Associations, 26 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 615, p. 3 (1997)
and Tullo Vigevani & Marcelo Passini Mariano, ALCA: O Gigante e os Anões,
21-24 (Senac, 2003).
5 The nations are: Antigua and Barbuda,
Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada,
Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, St. Vicent and the Grenadines, St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis,
Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, the United States of America, and
Venezuela. See <http://www.ftaa-alca.org/>
(official website of the FTAA) (last visited March 11, 2004).
6 See <http://www.ftaa-alca.org/Summits/Miami/declara_e.asp>.
(last visited March 11, 2004).
7 See <http://www.ftaa-alca.org/Summits_e.asp>
(last visited March 11, 2004)
8 See <http://www.ftaa-alca.org/Minis_e.asp>
(last visited March 11, 2004).
9 Id.
10 Interview with the Brazilian
Minister of Foreign Relations, Celso Luiz Nunes Amorim, published in Revista
Época [Brazilian magazine], January 5, 2004, in <http://www.mre.gov.br/>
(last visited March 14, 2004), and Joe Zopolsky, Implementing the FTAA: A
Survey of Hemispheric Unification Efforts within the Americas Over the Past Ten
Years, 9 Currents Int’l Trade L. J. 91, 91 (2000).
11 See Marc A. Miles at al.
2004 Index of Economic Freedom, 205 (The Heritage Foundation and the Wall
Street Journal, 2004).
12 See <http://www.worldbank.org/> (official
website of the World Bank) (last visited March 10, 2004).
13 Christopher M. Bruner, Hemispheric
Integration and the Politics of Regionalism: The Free Trade Area of the
Americas (FTAA), 33 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 1, 3 (2002).
14 See <http://www.worldbank.org/> (source: World
Development Indicators database, August 2003) (last visited March 10, 2004).
15 See Marc A. Miles et alli, supra
note 11, at 115. In 2001, the annual GDP growth was 1.4, and 1.5 in 2002 (see <http://www.worldbank.org/>, last visited
March 10, 2004).
16 Keith S. Rosenn, Whither Brazil:
MERCOSUL and the Devaluation Crisis, 5 NAFTA L. & Bus. Rev. Am. 422, 424
(1999).
17 Joe Zopolsky, supra note 10,
at 92.
18 See supra note 13, at
26.
19 Id.
20 Argentina major export trading
partners are: Brazil 28.2%, US 11.1%, Chile 11.0%, Spain 4.1%. Its major import
trading partners are: Brazil 36.5%, US 21.3%, Germany 5.5%, Italy 4.4%. Paraguay
major export trading partners are: Brazil 37.2%, Uruguay 17.1%, Argentina 3.6%.
Its major import trading partners are: Brazil 32.2%, Argentina 20.0%, Uruguay
4.3%. Uruguay major export trading partners are: Brazil 23.8%, Argentina 18.4%,
US 8.9%, Germany 3.7%. Its major import trading partners are: Argentina 23.0%,
Brazil 19.1%, US 11.4%, Italy 4.4%, UK 4.1%. And Brazil major export trading
partners are: US 25.7%, Argentina 11.6%, Germany 5.4%, Netherlands 4.4%. Its
major import trading partners are: US 27.4%, Argentina 13.5%, Germany 8.9%,
Japan 5.0%. See Marc A. Miles at al, supra note 11, at 81, 325, 407, and
115.
21 According with Martín Redrado,
Argentine vice-chancellor and chief MERCOSUR negotiator, negotiations with the
European Union are more advanced than the ones towards the creation of the
FTAA, in relation to which more offers have not been made. See Últimas
Notícias, 12/03/2004 – 19h38 in <http://www1.uol.com.br/economia/afp/ult35u33279.shl>
(last visited March 14, 2004).
22 David J. Gilmore, Free Trade
Area of the Americas: Is it Desirable?, 31 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 383,
413 (2000).
23 See supra note 13, at
68.
24 See U.S. Tariff Treatment
of Main Brazilian Products, Executive Summary, available at <http://www.brasilemb.org/trade_investment/executive_summary.pdf>
(last visited March 17, 2004).
25 See supra note 20, at
115.
26 See Brazilian Embassy,
Brazil at a Glance, available at <http://www.brasilemb.org/profile_brazil/profile1.shtml>
(last visited March 17, 2004).
27 See Laura Altieri, Between
Empire and Community: The United States and Multilateralism 2001-2003: A
Mid-Term Assessment: Trade and Economic Affairs: NAFTA and the FTAA: Regional
Alternatives to Multilateralism, 21 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 847, 856 ( 2003).
28 See supra note 24, at
2.
29 See interview with Roberto
Giannetti da Fonseca, former Secretary of Brazil’s Foreign Trade Chamber,
Revista Istoé [Brazilian magazine], November 5, 2003, at 11.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 See Christian Lohbauer, Alca: Uma
Perspectiva dos Desafios do Brasil, in O Brasil e a Alca: Os Desafios da
Integração, 243 (Alberto do Amaral Junior & Michelle Ratton Sanchez, eds.,
Aduaneiras ed., 2003).
33 See supra note 24.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 See Clóvis Rossi, Comércio
Exterior, in <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/dinheiro/fi1502200422.htm>
(last visited February 15, 2004).
37 See Revista Época, supra note 10, at
2.
38 Id.
39 See supra note 24.
40 See interview with the
Brazilian Minister of Foreign Relations, Celso Luiz Nunes Amorim, published in
Revista Veja [Brazilian magazine], January 28, 2004, in <http://www.mre.gov.br/>/portugues/politica_externa/discursos/discurso_detalhe.asp?ID_DISC...
(last visited March 14, 2004).
41 See Revista Época, supra note 10, at
2.
42 Id.
43 See Portal Exame –
Economia in <http://portalexame.abril.uol.com.br/economia/conteudo_30278.shtml>
(last visited March 15, 2004).
44 See Portal Exame – Economia
in <http://portalexame.abril.com.br/economia/conteudo_31519.shtml>
(last visited March 20, 2004).
45 The United States, Canada,
Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, the
Dominican Republic, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Chile.
46 See supra note 36, at
2.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 See Tullo Vigevani & Marcelo
Passini Mariano, supra note 4, at 112-114.
50 Id.
51 Joseph J. Norton, Doing Business
under the FTAA: Reflections of a U.S. Business Lawyer, 6 NAFTA L. &
Bus. Rev. Am. 421, 433 (2000).
* Procurador da Fazenda Nacional, professor na
Universidade de Brasília, professor e diretor do curso de Direito da Universidade
Católica de Brasília, mestre em Direito Comparado pela Southern Methodist
University (EUA), doutor em Direito pela Universidade de São Paulo.
Disponível em: <http://jus2.uol.com.br/doutrina/texto.asp?id=5754>. Acesso em: 18 jul. 2006.